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THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT: 
DAMRON V. DAMRON AND THE FUTURE OF PARENTING 
AND CHILD CUSTODY IN NORTH DAKOTA 
In itself, homosexuality is as limiting as heterosexuality: 
the ideal should be to be capable of loving a woman or a man; either, a 
human being, without feeling fear, restraint, or obligation.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Simone de Beauvoir’s sentiments speak volumes about American 
culture; society is often preoccupied with comparing heterosexuality to 
homosexuality in many aspects of life.2  This notion is especially true in the 
family sphere with regard to how courts view homosexual and same-sex 
couple parenting.3  For many years, the topic of homosexual parents’ rights 
in child custody has been heavily debated.4  Discussions typically involve 
issues relating to moral character, nurturing style, and personal religious 
belief.5  While courts have traditionally considered the parenting skills of 
homosexual individuals and the appropriateness of their child rearing 
environments to be potentially hazardous to children for various reasons, 
gay and lesbian parents have recently pressured courts to stray from these 
conclusions.6 
For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court recently held in 
Damron v. Damron7 that the averment that a custodial parent is homosexual 
is not a per se reason to modify child custody.8  The environment in which 
 
1. Simone de Beauvoir—quotation, http://www.quotegarden.com/homosexuality.html. 
2. See Eileen P. Huff, The Children of Homosexual Parents:  The Voices the Courts Have Yet 
to Hear, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 695, 696 (2001) (providing that a homosexual 
parent provides a living environment as suitable for children as a heterosexual parent, and that 
“courts should not find a distinction between homosexual and heterosexual parenting”). 
3. See id. (explaining that in following early custody modification rulings, courts believed 
that homosexuality alone was grounds for modification). 
4. Id. 
5. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 833, 833 (1997) (arguing that homosexual or same-sex parenting will not result in the 
same positive upbringing of children as heterosexual parenting, and explaining why society 
generally reaches this conclusion). 
6. Bruce D. Gill, Best Interest of the Child?  A Critique of Judicially Sanctioned Arguments 
Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 TENN. L. REV. 361, 362 (2001) (arguing that 
gay and lesbian parents may provide an environment equal to that of heterosexual parents). 
7. 2003 ND 166, 670 N.W.2d 871. 
8. Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875. 
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the child lives, as well as the best interests of the child, are the most 
important issues surrounding custody.9  Homosexual parents have been 
encouraging courts, such as the North Dakota Supreme Court, to recognize 
the injustice of holding homosexual and heterosexual parents to a different 
standard with regard to child custody matters.10  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Damron could prompt other jurisdictions to 
ignore the topic of homosexuality altogether, or to ask for more evidence 
than a parent’s sexual orientation when considering whether a child’s best 
interests will be served.11  This more stringent approach would press those 
jurisdictions to truly address the best interests of the child, thereby 
preventing courts from considering how homosexuality will endanger a 
child.12  Courts would therefore also justly afford more parents the 
constitutionally recognized right to have and raise a family.13 
This note begins with a brief history of how courts have dealt with 
lesbian and gay parenting issues, followed by an overview of the legal 
standards applied in various jurisdictions to afford, or take away, rights 
from both children and homosexual parents.14  Most importantly, Part II 
focuses on Damron, which is the most recent North Dakota case to reach 
the conclusion that evidence of homosexuality is not a per se justification to 
modify child custody.15  Next, Part III discusses the evidence needed, as 
provided by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron, to modify a child 
custody ruling favoring a gay or lesbian parent in North Dakota.16  This 
section also discusses the rights of parents and the best interests of the 
child, facets upon which judiciaries focus in child custody determinations.17  
Part III further addresses the implications that Damron may have on future 
 
9. Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873. 
10. Gill, supra note 6, at 362. 
11. See generally Brief of Appellant at 4, Damron v. Damron, 2003 WL 23695772 (No. 
20030135) (N.D. (2003)) (arguing that modification of child custody due to a parent’s sexual 
orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause, and that many jurisdictions have held that a 
parent’s homosexuality cannot be considered in modification of custody unless the child is direct-
ly harmed); Gill, supra note 6, at 362 (arguing that a court may deny custody to a homosexual 
parent as a “pretext for the court’s own bias or political agenda regarding homosexuality”). 
12. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 695 (stating that although courts generally look at the 
best interests of the child when determining custody and modification, homosexuality is fre-
quently addressed and the courts incorrectly focus on this aspect of the case). 
13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the right to bear and raise 
children is a fundamental right). 
14. See discussion infra Part II (examining United States Supreme Court decisions, legal 
standards, and notions of the morality of homosexuality). 
15. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875. 
16. See discussion infra Part III (explaining the Damron decision and the amount of evidence 
needed to modify a preliminary custody ruling based on homosexuality). 
17. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining the best interests of the child standard and the 
rights of the parent). 
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North Dakota child custody issues.18  Then, Part IV acknowledges the pros-
pect of the disappearance of the stigmatization of homosexual parents, as 
well as a review of the negative and plausibly unfounded conclusions that 
North Dakota courts and judiciaries nationwide have reached when 
confronted with homosexual parenting issues.19  Finally, this note concludes 
with a suggestion for a more effective legal standard to determine child 
custody when homosexual parents or same-sex couples are involved, which 
would ensure that both children’s and parents’ rights are justly 
recognized.20 
Until recently, courts placed great emphasis on homosexuality to pre-
vent gay or lesbian parents from obtaining or maintaining custody of their 
children.21  The reasons for denying custody to gay and lesbian parents arise 
from the proverbial “tradition” of denying rights to gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgendered individuals, occurring at both federal and state levels.22  
In the future, however, North Dakota may have an impact in reversing those 
judicial tendencies in the child custody sphere, placing less emphasis on 
sexual orientation in child custody matters.23  Over time, North Dakota may 
completely erase the stigmatization of gay and lesbian parents.24  Courts 
would then emphasize only the most important factors in child custody 
matters, including the best interests of the child and the quality of parenting 
itself; but until that day surfaces, it must be determined why courts have 
historically denied parental rights and child custody to homosexual 
parents.25 
 
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (exploring the Damron decision). 
19. See discussion infra Part IV (describing Damron as a model for future North Dakota 
child custody cases). 
20. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the use of a standard that goes beyond that used 
in Damron to determine whether to award child custody to a homosexual parent). 
21. See Huff, supra note 2, at 699-701 (discussing the courts’ evaluation of the custodial 
rights of gay or lesbian parents). 
22. See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B (providing examples of rights denied to homo-
sexual individuals in various federal and state cases). 
23. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (arguing that as homosexual parents continue to 
press courts to focus less on homosexuality and more on the quality of parenting itself, there will 
be less emphasis on sexual orientation).  There is likely to be less emphasis on sexual orientation 
with an increased use of the middle ground and nexus standards, as well.  Id.; see also discussion 
infra Part III.B (analyzing three approaches to child custody modification). 
24. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (discussing Damron and the argument that North Dakota 
uses a stringent approach, making it difficult for heterosexual parents to prove that homosexuality 
will endanger a child).  If North Dakota courts continue to follow this approach and as case law 
changes, there may be little to no emphasis on homosexuality in the future.  Id. 
25. See Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (arguing that homosexuality should not be a focus in child 
custody cases, because it is unlikely that proof offering to distinguish between homosexual and 
heterosexual parenting would be viable); see also discussion infra Part II (reviewing federal and 
state cases that have denied rights and child custody to homosexual parents). 
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II. A HISTORY OF—AND REASONS FOR—DENYING RIGHTS 
AND CUSTODY TO HOMOSEXUAL INDIVIDUALS AND 
PARENTS 
The reasons that courts deny custody to lesbian and gay parents have 
been both numerous and diverse.26  Some of the most oft-quoted reasons to 
deny a homosexual parent custody are: (1) the child will become homo-
sexual; (2) the child will adopt socially unaccepted morals as he or she 
matures; (3) the child’s peers will ostracize him or her; or (4) the child is 
more likely to be molested by a homosexual parent than a heterosexual 
parent.27  These reasons for denying custody are viewed as unfounded by 
many individuals who advocate for the eradication of court-opined 
differences between homosexual and heterosexual parenting fitness.28  
Furthermore, any information that might be gleaned in support of these 
conclusions has been extremely limited in terms of social examination.29  
However, many state and federal courts have used these and several other 
“unfounded” reasons to deny custody to homosexual parents.30  The courts 
that use these reasons to deny custody may base custody denials on 
homosexual rights-related United States Supreme Court precedent.31  
Discussions relating to societal morals and values are topics that are often 
entrenched in some of the Court’s most influential decisions.32 
A. CONCERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Historically, legislators and U.S. courts have generally avoided afford-
ing rights to gay and lesbian individuals.33  Courts have often discussed the 
mores and values of American society, and are further concerned with how 
 
26. David M. Rosenblum, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 
1665, 1669-70 (1991). 
27. Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02. 
28. Id. at 702. 
29. See id. (arguing that the reasons set forth by courts to deny custody to homosexual 
parents lack factual support). 
30. See discussion infra Part II.A (examining the use of morality arguments in United States 
Supreme Court and state cases involving homosexual individuals). 
31. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (denying readmission of a 
former Boy Scouts member to the organization via the New Jersey public accommodation statute 
because the private organization, although alleging that it followed a set of mores and standards 
disallowing homosexual members, did not fall under the New Jersey statute).  See also Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual con-
duct was unconstitutional, while opining that society tends to view homosexuality as immoral). 
32. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating that society views homosexuality as 
immoral); Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (upholding the mores of the Boy Scouts organization to deny 
membership to a former member because of his sexuality). 
33. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 640 (stating that a private organization may deny membership 
if it deems homosexuality immoral). 
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various statutes or laws affording rights to homosexual individuals may 
negatively affect those values.34  Recent Supreme Court decisions, 
discussed in the following sections, reflect these views.35 
1. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,36 Dale challenged his expulsion from 
the Boy Scouts organization.37  The organization discovered that Dale was 
homosexual, and to justify his expulsion, averred that “homosexual conduct 
is inconsistent with the values [that the Boy Scouts organization] seeks to 
instill.”38  Although the New Jersey public accommodations statute forbade 
sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the statute could not afford redress to the former 
member because Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts) was a private 
organization.39  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court’s opinion and 
declared that whether the judiciary disagrees with the organization’s 
ideologies was not the issue before the Court; instead, the question was 
whether the State of New Jersey could require a private institution such as 
the Boy Scouts to readmit a member under the public accommodations 
statute.40  Justice Rehnquist suggested that the New Jersey public accom-
modations statute be applied narrowly to find that the former Boy Scouts 
member was justly disbanded due to his sexual orientation.41 
Leading the dissent in Dale, Justice Stevens accused the Court of 
applying the public accommodations statute too narrowly.42  He stated that 
the New Jersey law had previously been applied to “broadly [protect] the 
opportunity of all persons to obtain the advantages and privileges ‘of any 
place of public accommodation.’”43  Finally, Justice Stevens stated that the 
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the public accommodations facet 
would prohibit discrimination, had not in previous decisions hesitated to 
reject discriminatory policies applied by “private schools . . . and labor 




36. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
37. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 644-45 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 to 5-6 (West Supp. 2000)). 
40. Id. at 661. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 678-79. 
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majority opinion, Dale deserved redress.45  Justice Stevens’ analysis also 
chastised the Court for allowing private organizations to practice discrimi-
natory policies that affected the public generally.46 
The United States Supreme Court in Dale seemingly failed to remedy 
or alleviate the continuation of discriminatory practices.47  In the next few 
years, the Supreme Court faced additional issues surrounding the discrimi-
natory effects of statutes and policies upon homosexual individuals in other 
areas of the country.48  Instead of allowing discriminatory practices to con-
tinue as in Dale, however, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that 
discriminated against gay and lesbian individuals.49 
2. Lawrence v. Texas 
In 2003, the Supreme Court considered the rights of gay and lesbian 
individuals when the Court analyzed whether a public statute could right-
fully interfere with the private lives of persons.50  In Lawrence v. Texas,51 a 
Texas statute deemed sexual conduct between members of the same sex a 
criminal act.52  In Lawrence, the Court found that the state did not offer a 
legitimate interest in interfering with the “personal and private life of the 
individual.”53 
The Lawrence decision was a step toward recognizing a growing need 
for the equal rights of homosexual persons.54  The Court recognized that, 
while policies may purport to be directed at prohibiting unfavorable activi-
ties of all persons, many laws are unjustly directed to prohibit the actions of 
a particular group.55  In Lawrence, gay and lesbian individuals comprised 
 
45. See id. (stating that the Court had not hesitated to reject discriminatory policies in pre-
vious decisions, yet here a homosexual individual was discriminated against and the Court upheld 
the public accommodation statute). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (holding that a statute criminal-
izing sodomy was unconstitutional because it discriminated against a targeted group). 
49. Id. 
50. See id. (stating that “[w]hen a State makes homosexual conduct criminal,” thus inter-
fering with the private lives of individuals, the statute’s only purpose is to discriminate). 
51. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
53. Id. at 578. 
54. See id. (holding that the Texas statute was unconstitutional because it criminalized pri-
vate activity).  The Court brought the issue of discrimination to the forefront of the discussion in 
stating that the statute’s only purpose was to discriminate against homosexuals.  Id.  The Court 
also stressed the need for the right to privacy.  Id. 
55. Id. at 583. 
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the targeted group.56  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, repri-
manded the state and emphasized the true purpose of the Texas statute: 
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual con-
sent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are entitled to respect for 
their private lives.  The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.57  
By deeming the Texas statute unconstitutional, the Lawrence decision 
promoted a movement in legislation to recognize the rights of homosexual 
individuals.58  In fact, since Lawrence was decided, most jurisdictions have 
repealed their laws prohibiting non-marital or consensual sexual activity.59  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence departed from Dale’s 
precedent, and showed that the private lives of individuals were beginning 
to be recognized more readily by state legislatures and judiciaries.60  Unlike 
Dale, the Lawrence Court recognized that the sexuality of an individual—
and not merely the sexual activity in which the individual engages—is a 
private facet of one’s life, undeserving of public scrutiny and discrimina-
tion.61  Thus, the societal value of privacy became an important topic 
regarding gay and lesbian rights.62 
3. Societal Values in Federal and State Decisions 
Although Dale and Lawrence do not directly adhere to the topic of the 
rights of homosexual parents and the best interests of children in custody 
hearings, the decisions address how the Court generally views homosexu-
ality.63  The cases also address, in the majority and dissenting opinions, the 
mores and values of society and the struggles of gay and lesbian individuals 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 578. 
58. See Jennifer Naeger, And Then There Were None: The Repeal of Sodomy Laws After 
Lawrence v. Texas and Its Effect on the Custody and Visitation Rights of Gay and Lesbian 
Parents, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 408-19 (2004) (outlining Lawrence and its effect on similar 
sodomy laws and the parental rights of homosexual parents). 
59. Id. at 422. 
60. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76 (stressing the importance of the right to privacy). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See generally id. at 563 (stating that society generally views homosexuality as immoral); 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (stating that homosexuals may be denied 
readmission to the Boy Scouts if homosexuality is deemed immoral). 
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in both private and public spheres.64  The discussion of both public and 
private areas is necessary, as both are involved in domestic court delibera-
tions of child custody.65  In considering child custody and child placement, 
courts continue to analyze public approval of homosexuality and how 
children will be affected in their private environments.66 
The moral and value issues discussed in United States Supreme Court 
cases are also considered by state courts in child custody cases.67  In the 
Nebraska case of Hassenstab v. Hassenstab,68 for example, a woman’s ex-
husband sought to modify child custody when he discovered that she was 
openly homosexual.69  A Nebraska child custody law required “[t]he party 
seeking modification of child custody [to bear] the burden of showing that a 
material change in circumstances has occurred.”70  While the woman’s ex-
husband offered that an openly homosexual relationship was sufficient to 
justify a change in custody, the Nebraska Court of Appeals held that homo-
sexuality alone was not a factor in modifying custody; however, homosexu-
ality could be considered in addition to other factors, including the “moral 
fitness of the child’s parents and the parents’ sexual conduct.”71 
Hassenstab emanated the sentiments of mores, values, and negative 
responses to homosexual “activities” discussed in Dale and Lawrence.72  
The Nebraska Appellate Court’s holding, however, was a movement toward 
furthering gay and lesbian parental rights and a realization of what truly is 
in the best interests of the child, because the court determined that homo-
sexuality “does not render [a] parent unfit or require an award of custody to 
the other parent.”73  The Nebraska Appellate Court is one of several courts, 
however, that have expressed concern with the idea that homosexual 
 
64. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (finding that many Americans believe homosexuality is 
immoral); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 640 (reiterating that the Boy Scouts deem homosexuality as 
immoral). 
65. See Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 371-73 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing 
both public, social behavior and the private sexual conduct of lesbian partners in determining 
whether child custody modification should occur). 
66. Id. 
67. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (explaining society’s general views regarding homo-
sexuality); see also Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 374 (Hannon, J., dissenting) (stating that homo-
sexuality should be considered because the parents’ moral fitness, due to homosexuality, may 
have a bearing on the issue). 
68. 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). 
69. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372. 
70. Id. at 371. 
71. Id. at 372. 
72. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (discussing society’s views on homosexuality); Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 665 (discussing the morals that the Boy Scouts organization 
seeks to instill in its members); Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 374 (Hannon, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the morality of homosexuality should be considered in determining custody). 
73. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372. 
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parents have the capacity to endanger children, and therefore authorize 
child custody modification.74 
As previously mentioned, courts follow the lead of United States 
Supreme Court precedent and discuss the concept of morality as grounds 
for child custody and custody modification.75  Although it is appropriate for 
a court to carefully evaluate morality as an important consideration in many 
matters, courts’ holdings often suggest that homosexuality is in itself 
immoral, thus rendering homosexual parents unfit to raise children.76  
Moreover, many courts seemingly believe that the morals and values of 
homosexual parents differ from the morals and values of heterosexual 
parents.77 
4. Other Reasons Courts Cite to Deny Custody to Gay and 
Lesbian Parents 
There are many reasons, aside from moral considerations, that courts 
provide when deciding whether to award or modify custody favoring 
homosexual parents.78  One reason that courts may not grant custody to a 
homosexual parent is possible stigmatization of the child for his or her 
parent’s sexual orientation.79  Lynn D. Wardle, proponent of “traditional 
families,” has stated: “The legalization of homosexual parenting, essentially 
rendering sexual conduct of a parent a presumably irrelevant factor for 
purposes of child custody . . . would constitute a significant shift in the legal 
and social assumptions and legal model of parenting.”80 
Of the reasons offered to deny lesbian and gay parents the custody of 
their children, most arguably represent speculative social fear of homosexu-
ality.81  Furthermore, the idea that Wardle expresses, that the legalization of 
homosexual parenting would corrupt social values and change social 
 
74. See McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 113-14 (Idaho 2004) (discussing a mother’s wish 
to conceal her ex-husband’s homosexuality from her children in a child custody dispute); 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality has the 
potential to harm children); Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372 (discussing the morality of 
homosexual individuals and homosexual relationships). 
75. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (stating that society often views homosexuality as 
immoral); Dale, 530 U.S. at 673 (stating that the standards of morality of a private organization 
may warrant the denial of readmission of a homosexual man). 
76. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 673 (allowing the Boy Scouts organization to deny readmis-
sion to a former Boy Scouts member because the organization believed that homosexuality was 
immoral and did not further the values that the organization sought to instill). 
77. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1669-70. 
78. Id. at 1667-84. 
79. Id. 
80. Wardle, supra note 5, at 838. 
81. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1677-78. 
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assumptions, is common, but may be negated.82  Contrary to Wardle’s 
belief, there are many reasons to favor full legalization of homosexual 
parenting and award homosexual parents child custody.83  Some arguments 
in favor of the full legalization of homosexual parenting include the eradi-
cation of social stigmatization and the formation of strong and healthy 
families.84 
The acknowledgment of lesbian and gay parents would also promote 
adept—and therefore prevent inept—parenting.85  For example, suppose a 
court were to focus on the homosexuality of a parent and offer child cus-
tody to the child’s socially accepted heterosexual parent.86  That child may 
be faced with a future of inept parenting.87  Courts may simply assume that 
the heterosexual parent, unlike the child’s homosexual parent, is not 
strapped with social rejection and will therefore provide a more caring and 
stable environment.88 
Like the court in the above example, advocates of traditional families 
and heterosexual parenting feel that this parent-child relationship is neces-
sary for the healthy upbringing of a child.89  This notion of necessity is 
connected to the belief that only heterosexuals are entitled to marriage and 
parenting.  It is also attached to the idea that the presence of both male and 
female parents is essential for a child’s healthy development.90  Proponents 
of heterosexual-only parenting allege that “recent research suggest[s] that a 
daddy and a mommy together provide by far the best environment in which 
a child may be reared.”91  Proponents, such as Wardle, also argue that the 
traditional family best serves child development because “[s]eparation of 
 
82. See generally id. at 1665-66 (arguing that misunderstandings of homosexuality and 
societal fears contribute to the idea that homosexual parenting will harm children). 
83. Huff, supra note 2, at 695-99. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. (stating that strong families may be formed with homosexual parents, and that 
homosexuals do not lack the parenting skills that heterosexual parents possess). 
86. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining the possible negative impact 
resulting from forcing a child into a heterosexual household versus a homosexual household). 
87. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 696-99 (suggesting that homosexual parents are just 
as capable as heterosexual parents at raising children in a safe and healthy living environment).  If 
Huff’s sentiments ring true, and a child were placed in a household simply because that household 
was headed by a heterosexual parent, a court would lose sight of the child’s best interests.  Id.  
The main focus would be on sexuality rather than the environment that the parents provide.  Id.  
Thus, the focus of the court would move from the best interests of the child to the parent’s 
sexuality.  Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Wardle, supra note 5, at 857. 
90. Jenny Stokes, Homosexuality: Same-Sex Parenting (2007), http://www.saltshakers.org. 
au/html/P/9/B/235/; see also Wardle, supra note 5, at 857 (arguing that children need both a 
mother and a father to ensure the best possible living environment). 
91. Wardle, supra note 5, at 857. 
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children from their fathers is ‘the leading cause of declining child well-
being in our society.’”92  However, according to advocates for the recogni-
tion of homosexual parenting and otherwise diverse family relationships, 
these statements are little more than overbroad generalizations lacking 
fundamental and factual support.93  Furthermore, the proponents of hetero-
sexual-only, two-parent traditional families provide only arguments discus-
sing the decline of societal mores and an inferred increase in homosexual 
parenting, concrete evidence of which is limited.94 
With all of the aforementioned arguments favoring limits to homo-
sexual parenting, many courts have reached conclusions in child custody 
and custody-related matters that appease society’s fears or dislikes of 
homosexuality.95  This practice does little to further the best interests of the 
child or parental rights.96  Instead, the practice perpetuates the misunder-
standing that homosexual parents provide fewer benefits or somehow offer 
substandard care for their children when compared to heterosexual 
parents.97 
It is imperative that courts endorse the most just approach toward these 
issues for both children and parents.98  To reach a just result, courts should 
not apply standards implying a difference between homosexual and 
heterosexual individuals.99  If courts were to discontinue distinguishing 
between homosexual and heterosexual individuals, child custody cases 
would focus more on the child and less on the parents, and custody matters 
would less likely result in undue distinctions between homosexual and 
heterosexual parenting.100  The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. 
State of Nebraska101 can be said to have supported this just approach as 
early as 1923: “[L]iberty . . . denotes . . . the right of the individual to . . . 
 
92. Id. at 859. 
93. See Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 2676 (citing Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (explaining that courts’ fears of homosexual 
parenting often arise from the fear that homosexuality is a “learned behavior” and that children 
would “choose” a homosexual “lifestyle,” and refuting these fears with an explanation of psycho-
logical studies providing otherwise)). 
94. See id. at 1666-69 (stating generally that society believes that homosexuality is harmful 
and will harm children).  Very little is offered to prove that homosexuality in itself will harm 
children, because the notions of harm are based mostly on fear of homosexuality.  Id. 
95. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02 (arguing that courts often find differences 
between homosexual and heterosexual parents and focus on their sexuality, regardless of the 






101. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.  The established doctrine is that this 
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public 
interest.”102  Although courts may profess to protect “public interest” or the 
moral fitness of American citizens by denying custody to homosexual 
parents, protection is a fallacy when it interferes with the liberty to have and 
raise a family.103 
B. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSITION ON HOMOSEXUAL PARENTING IN 
CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS 
Several North Dakota cases have determined whether to award child 
custody to homosexual parents.104  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
decisions in these cases provide a wide spectrum of opinions regarding 
homosexual parenting.105  Damron v. Damron, the most recent child cus-
tody decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court to overrule a per se bar 
to awarding custody to a homosexual parent, may offer an updated 
approach in determining child custody matters.106 
1. Child Custody and Homosexual Parenting Prior to Damron 
In concert with the traditional view that homosexuality has a negative 
affect on the mores of society, until recently North Dakota case law 
followed the 1981 child custody ruling of Jacobson v. Jacobson.107  In 
Jacobson, a man sought to modify child custody when he discovered that 
his ex-wife Sandra was a lesbian, and believed that her homosexual 
relationship with another woman would have a negative impact on their 
 
102. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400. 
103. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02 (stating that courts place too much emphasis 
on the morality of homosexuality and should focus instead on a parent’s ability to raise a child 
successfully and in a healthy environment). 
104. See, e.g., Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875 (opining that 
the homosexuality of a mother was not a per se bar to child custody in a custody modification 
case); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993) (holding that although the father 
harmed his children by instilling his ideas about homosexuality in them, the father retained 
custody because homosexuality could be considered as a factor in the child custody dispute); 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 79-82 (N.D. 1981) (discussing whether homosexuality will 
harm children in a child custody modification dispute). 
105. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (holding that homosexuality is a per se bar to child 
custody); but see Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a per se bar to 
child custody). 
106. See Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (determining that homosexuality is not a reason to 
deny a parent custody of a child, and holding that the parent seeking child custody modification 
must provide evidence sufficient to show that the child’s well-being is in danger). 
107. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981). 
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children.108  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, “we believe the 
homosexuality of Sandra is the overriding factor.”109  The court concluded 
that, since both parents were otherwise equally fit to care for their children, 
it was in the best interests of the children to be placed with their father.110  
The court found that the mother’s homosexuality would potentially have an 
adverse affect on the children’s moral well-being.111 
In addition to finding that homosexuality alone may harm children, 
North Dakota case law has offered comparisons as to the difference 
between heterosexual and homosexual parenting.112  In Lapp v. Lapp,113 a 
mother moved for child custody modification when she discovered that her 
ex-husband had entered into a new relationship.114  She declared that her 
ex-husband’s decision to move in with another woman merited a change in 
circumstances that was significant enough to require modification.115  The 
mother further argued that because her ex-husband was living with a 
woman to whom he was not married, the living arrangement would be 
detrimental to their child.116  The North Dakota Supreme Court declared 
that the detrimental effect of the father’s relationship would be only specu-
lative.117  The court also distinguished the case from Jacobson.118  In Lapp, 
both individuals vying for custody were heterosexual.119  In Jacobson, the 
custodial parent, who ultimately lost custody, was homosexual.120  The 
Lapp court found this distinction important, stating, “the fact that the moth-
er was involved in a homosexual relationship in Jacobson was of major 
importance in our decision.”121  Therefore, it may be inferred that if the 
father in Lapp was living with a man instead of a woman, his homosexual 
 
108. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 78. 
109. Id. at 80. 
110. Id. at 80-81. 
111. See id. at 79 (reiterating the trial court’s concern that the children would “suffer from 
the ‘slings and arrows’ of a disapproving society”). 
112. See Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350, 352 (N.D. 1983) (stating that the relationship of a 
homosexual individual may have a detrimental effect on children, and distinguishing homosexual 
parents from heterosexual parents). 
113. 336 N.W.2d 350. 
114. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d at 351. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 352-53. 
118. Id. at 352. 
119. Id. at 350. 
120. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 78 (1981). 
121. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d at 352. 
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relationship may have provided grounds for child custody modification in 
Lapp as it did in Jacobson.122 
In Johnson v. Schlotman,123 the North Dakota Supreme Court again 
discussed homosexuality as a major part of its decision.124  In Schlotman, 
decided in 1993, the court denied an openly homosexual mother custody of 
her children.125  When the mother moved to modify custody, the court 
spoke about her relationship and living arrangement with another 
woman.126 
Although homosexuality encompassed much of the court’s discussion, 
the parties to the case also focused on the immorality of homosexuality.127  
The father in Schlotman had ingrained his beliefs about the immorality of 
homosexuality in his children.128  The court reprimanded the children’s 
father for “expos[ing] the children to his belief that homosexuality is devi-
ant and is not to be tolerated,” and for turning his children “away from the 
other parent by poisoning the well.”  Although the court stressed that “big-
otry, in whatever form, on the part of a parent is a matter affecting the best 
interests of the children,” the court declined to modify the custody order in 
favor of the children’s homosexual mother.129  The court concluded that it 
would be in the children’s best interests to remain with their father, even 
though, against the best interests of the children, he would likely continue 
to “poison the well.”130 
2. Damron v. Damron 
Twenty-one years after Schlotman was decided, Damron v. Damron 
overruled the “presumption of harm to children living in a lesbian house-
hold and . . . any requirement for evidence of actual or potential harm to the 
 
122. See id. at 352 (stating that Jacobson is distinguishable from the present case due to the 
homosexual relationship in Jacobson); Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 78 (modifying a custody order in 
favor of the noncustodial parent, and finding that the children’s well-being was in danger due to 
the custodial parent’s homosexual relationship). 
123. 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993). 
124. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d at 832. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 834. 
127. See id. at 832 (addressing the children’s father’s concern that due to their mother’s 
homosexuality, she would be unfit as a parent); see also id. at 833 (discussing testimony regarding 
the children’s father’s belief that homosexuality was “deviant behavior that should not be 
tolerated”); id. (recalling expert testimony regarding the “propriety of [offering] custody” to a 
homosexual parent). 
128. Id. at 834-35. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 834. 
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children” created by Jacobson.131  In Damron, a father moved to modify the 
custody order of the trial court when he discovered that his wife was homo-
sexual.132  He relied on the court’s ruling in Jacobson to state that a homo-
sexual parent could not create a living environment that would be in the 
best interests of the child.133  The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron, 
however, focused not primarily on the homosexuality of the mother, but on 
the best interests of the child.134  The court further discussed the aversion 
that most jurisdictions tend to carry toward modifying custody rulings.135 
The children’s father disagreed; he believed that modification was 
necessary and testified that the mother’s relationship would have a detri-
mental affect on the children’s “moral character.”136  The Damron court, 
however, required actual evidence showing that the children would be 
harmed, and stated that the father presented none.137  Therefore, the court 
held that no modification would take place.138 
As the Damron holding suggests, North Dakota courts have begun to 
recognize the best interests of the children and the rights of homosexual 
parents.139  In fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned both con-
siderations in the Damron decision.140  The court stated that its purpose was 
“to look solely to the best interest[s] of the particular children in the case 
before the [c]ourt.”141  In overruling the presumption that a homosexual 
household would harm children, the court recognized the rights of the 
parent.142  Unlike Jacobson, the Damron court’s decision did not allow 
children to be as easily removed from the homosexual parent’s home.143  As 
 
131. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 9, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875; see also Jacobson v. 
Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, at 81-82 (holding that modification may take place due to the custodial 
parent’s homosexual relationship). 
132. Damron, ¶ 2, 670 N.W.2d at 873. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874. 
135. Id. ¶ 6. 
136. Id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Compare Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (stating that homo-
sexuality was a significant factor in denying custody), with Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 
(holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying child custody absent actual proof that 
the child was harmed). 
140. Damron, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
141. Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873. 
142. See generally id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (stating that homosexuality is not grounds for 
custody modification, and inferring a parent’s right to privacy to engage in a private relationship 
unless that relationship endangers the child). 
143. See id. (refusing to modify custody based on homosexuality when the father had not 
offered actual proof of harm to the children); but see Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (modifying 
child custody because of the mother’s homosexual relationship). 
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Damron suggests in overruling Jacobson, the rights of the parent may be an 
inevitable consideration in child custody matters; however, the best 
interests of the child continue to be the central theme in child custody 
concerns.144 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
While the best interests of the child factors are by far the most impor-
tant considerations in child custody matters, courts consider various other 
factors when determining what truly will be in a child’s best interests.145  In 
awarding custody to homosexual parents, courts often look to the sexuality 
of the parent to determine whether the parent’s sexuality or relationships 
will harm the child in any way.146  To reach this conclusion, courts use the 
per se, middle ground, or nexus approaches to award custody to either the 
heterosexual or homosexual parent.147 
A. FACTORS DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
The Damron court of course could not have reached its conclusion to 
overrule Jacobson had it not analyzed statutes and case law regarding child 
custody.148  In initial child custody hearings, a court generally has discretion 
to make custody determinations as it sees fit, while using accepted stan-
dards.149  A court must, however, determine custody in regard to the best 
interests of the child.150  This has long been an established rule, not only in 
North Dakota, but in nearly all state courts.151 
In North Dakota, when the best interests of the child are found in a 
preliminary custody hearing, the court may modify that ruling at any time to 
 
144. See N.D. CENT. CODE §14-09-06.6 (2007) (providing that post-judgment modification 
is necessary to serve the best interests of the child); Damron, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873 (“[The] 
function of the court in matters of child custody is to look solely to the best interest[s] of the 
particular children.”); LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 4:4 (2006) (listing 
various factors that courts look to when serving the child’s best interests). 
145. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining factors which courts look to when 
determining the best interests of the child). 
146. See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining the legal standards that courts use in child 
custody matters involving homosexual parents). 
147. Id. 
148. See Damron, ¶¶ 6-12, 670 N.W.2d at 874-76 (citing § 14-09-06; §§ 14-09-06.6(5)(b) to 
(6)(a)-(b) & 14-09-06.6(8) (2005); Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶ 12, 561 N.W.2d 612, 616) 
(suggesting authority to overrule Jacobson). 
149. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22.1 (2007) (defining the scope of the court’s 
discretion). 
150. Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W. 869, 871 (N.D. 1919). 
151. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (providing a list of states that focus on the best 
interests of the child). 
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ensure the best interests of the child.152  When the court determines the best 
interests of the child, it also determines the fitness of the parents.153  The 
parents each have “equal rights with regard to the care, custody, education, 
and control of the children.”154 
Upon preliminary custody determination, a court may modify the 
custody order no sooner than two years after the initial custody order unless 
“[t]he child’s present environment may endanger the child’s physical or 
emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development[.]”155  A 
court may also modify the initial custody order before the two-year 
condition if it determines that the environment in which the child is living is 
otherwise unfit and will endanger the child.156  A change in custody will be 
ordered if it will ensure that the best interests of the child are satisfied.157 
Custody may also be modified if a material change has occurred in the 
circumstances of the custody of that child.158  When a parent wishes to 
modify a prior custody ruling due to a “material change in circumstances,” 
the burden of proof is on that parent to show that significant changes have 
occurred so as to justify modification.159  Courts perform a two-step analy-
sis when confronted with a request for modification on these grounds.160  A 
court first determines whether a significant change in circumstances has 
indeed occurred, followed by whether that change requires modification in 
order to meet the best interests of the child.161 
North Dakota’s approach to child custody is an approach that is 
uniform throughout the country.162  The best interests of the child are 
primary conditions requiring fulfillment in preliminary custody hearings.163  
Modification proceedings occur in the same manner.164  Courts look to 
whether a substantial change has occurred to warrant modification.165 
 
152. § 14-05-22.1. 
153. Id. § 14-09-06. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. § 14-09-06.6(3)(b) (2005). 
156. Id. §§ 14-09-06.6(5)(b); 14-09-06.6(6)(a)-(b). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. § 14-09-06.6(8). 
160. Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶ 12, 561 N.W.2d 612, 616. 
161. Id. 
162. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (offering a list of many states, including North 
Dakota, that focus on the best interests of the child). 
163. Id. 
164. Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual 
or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R.5TH 591, 591 (1998). 
165. See id. (stating that child custody modifications require a showing that changes have 
taken place, thus proving that modification will be in the child’s best interests). 
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Courts tend to follow an additional set of criteria in finding the best 
interests of the child in both preliminary and custody modification 
hearings.166  The criteria include the quality of the child’s home environ-
ment, the parents’ involvement and influence in the child’s life, and the 
wishes of both the parents and child, if the child has reached a sufficient 
maturity level to offer his or her opinion on the matter.167  Among the 
factors that a court may consider in finding the child’s best interests, 
however, the sexual orientation of the parent should not be considered.168  
Courts also should not consider the private sexual conduct of the parent 
unless it is proven that the child is harmed by such conduct, or that the 
private conduct interferes with the parent’s ability to provide the requisite 
level of care and nurturing necessary to child development.169 
The rules set forth above may be applied and analyzed pursuant to 
North Dakota child custody cases.170  As introduced in Part II.B, the non-
custodial parents in Jacobson, Lapp, Schlotman, and Damron sought 
custody modification due to a change in circumstances.171  In each case, 
either the custodial parents’ homosexuality was discovered, or the parents’ 
sexual conduct was argued to be a circumstance sufficient to modify a 
custody order.172  Although the North Dakota Supreme Court arrived at a 
different conclusion in Damron than its predecessors Jacobson, Lapp, and 
Schlotman, the court announced the same reason for declining to modify the 
custody order in Damron as in the other child custody cases.173  The reason 
offered was that “the function of the court in matters of child custody is to 
look solely to the best interest[s] of the particular children in the case before 
the [c]ourt.”174 
The Damron result shows that the North Dakota Supreme Court 
applied the aforementioned criteria regarding the wishes of the child and 
parent, as well as the child’s home environment to reach the conclusion that 
the best interest of the children would best be served by remaining in their 
mother’s custody; however, Damron tended to adapt a slight variation of 
the rule that the sexuality of the parent may not be considered by the court 
 




170. See discussion supra Part II.B (analyzing North Dakota cases that illustrate custody 
determinations and homosexual parenting issues in North Dakota). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d 871, 873. 
174. Id. 
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in a custody modification hearing.175  The Damron court found that the 
sexuality of the custodial parent may not be considered as grounds for 
modifying custody, unless the parent attempting to modify could show that 
the environment in which the child is living actually endangers the child’s 
well-being.176  Homosexuality, taken alone, was not to be considered as 
grounds for modification because it did not establish that a child would be 
harmed.177 
The best interests of the child are the most cited considerations in child 
custody and custody modification hearings.178  The sexuality of a parent 
and the parent’s private sexual conduct is also often considered, however.179  
The effect that this consideration has on custody results is the focus of Part 
III.B.180 
B. COMMON LEGAL STANDARDS USED BY COURTS IN CHILD 
CUSTODY HEARINGS INVOLVING HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS 
As discussed in Part III.A, courts generally agree that the best interests 
of the child are the most important considerations in child custody 
proceedings.181  Although courts agree on these factors, courts tend to 
follow different legal standards when determining the effect that a parent’s 
homosexuality will have on the outcome of a child custody or custody 
modification case.182  It may be inferred that the use of these different 
standards to award or deny custody does not necessarily mean that the 
courts focus on the best interests of the child as purported.183  Nevertheless, 
the various standards, including the per se, middle ground, and nexus 
approaches, continue to be applied.184 
 
175. ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4. 
176. Damron, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
177. Id. at 875. 
178. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (stating that Rhode Island, New York, Wyoming, 
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North Dakota, and many other state courts look to the 
best interests of the child). 
179. Trainor, supra note 164, § 3[a] (citing Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996)).  
In Tucker, the court stated that a mother’s cohabitation with her partner demonstrated a lack of 
“moral example.”  Tucker, 910 P.2d at 1213. 
180. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the per se, middle ground, and nexus 
approaches). 
181. Huff, supra note 2, at 699. 
182. Id. 
183. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1686-87. 
184. Huff, supra note 2, at 699. 
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1. The Per Se Approach 
Perhaps the harshest standard toward homosexual parents in custody 
and custody modification cases, the per se approach allows the court to 
deny custody to a homosexual parent simply upon the basis that the parent 
is homosexual.185  In using this infrequently applied approach, courts look 
merely to whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the parent is 
homosexual when determining the best interests of the child.186  Upon 
finding that a parent is homosexual, a court infers that the child’s living 
environment is unfit, and the court either denies initial custody to the 
homosexual parent or grants the heterosexual parent’s motion to modify a 
previous custody ruling.187 
Jacobson illustrates the premise of the per se approach.188  Although 
the North Dakota Supreme Court opined in Jacobson that homosexuality 
was a “significant factor” to deny custody to the homosexual parent, the 
court ruled that homosexuality was against societal mores, and thus 
rendered a homosexual parent unfit to provide a healthy living environment 
for a child.189  The per se approach is rarely applied by courts in modern 
child custody matters, however.190  Many courts instead follow the middle 
ground approach.191 
2. The Middle Ground Approach 
Courts that follow the middle ground approach consider a parent’s 
homosexuality as one factor amidst other factors to determine the best 
interests of the child.192  Using the middle ground approach, homosexuality 
alone is not usually a reason to deny custody to a parent.193  A court may 
not refuse custody to that parent “without actually finding clear evidence of 
any detriment to the child.”194  Courts applying this standard often deter-
mine that a child will be socially or morally harmed as a result of living 
with a homosexual parent.195 
 
185. Id. at 699-700. 
186. Id. at 700. 
187. Id. 
188. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality 
is a per se bar to child custody in custody determinations, because the environment provided by a 
homosexual parent has the potential to harm a child). 
189. Id. at 80, 82 (emphasis added). 
190. Huff, supra note 2, at 699. 
191. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the middle ground approach). 
192. Huff, supra note 2, at 699. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 700. 
195. Id. 
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Schlotman offers an illustration of the middle ground approach.196  
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court scolded the children’s father in 
Schlotman for his bigoted comments about homosexuality and for perpetu-
ating those sentiments among his children, the court allowed the children to 
remain with their father when their homosexual mother sought modifi-
cation.197  The court considered the parents generally equally fit to raise the 
children despite the father’s behavior, but the court allowed the father to 
retain custody partially because the children would be “embarrassed” by 
their mother.198  Thus, homosexuality was a factor that was used to deny 
custody to the children’s mother.199  While many courts apply the middle 
ground approach to determine custody matters, yet another standard is 
applied:  the nexus standard.200 
3. The Nexus Standard 
The nexus standard, potentially the most favorable standard to homo-
sexual parents seeking child custody, requires actual and real evidence of 
harm to the child as a result of the parent’s sexual orientation.201  Unlike the 
per se approach, the parent’s homosexuality is not the sole deciding factor 
as to whether custody may be granted.202  The nexus standard is similar to 
the middle ground approach in that the homosexuality of the parent is a 
factor considered among many others.203  However, the nexus standard is 
unlike the middle ground approach in that homosexuality is considered as a 
factor only if that factor is deemed and proven to impede the child’s best 
interests.204 
The nexus standard is viewed as the “most direct application of the 
traditional ‘best interest[s] of the child’ standard, because it does not create 
an inference that a parent’s homosexuality itself has a detrimental impact on 
the child’s upbringing.”205  While homosexuality may be viewed as a 
possible harm to a child’s best interests under the middle ground approach, 
it may not be a reason to deny child custody or custody modification under 
the nexus standard unless a parent’s homosexuality would clearly interfere 
 
196. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 833 (N.D. 1993) (stating that 
homosexuality may be considered in child custody). 
197. Id. at 834. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the facets of the nexus standard). 
201. Huff, supra note 2, at 700-01. 
202. Id.  
203. Id.  
204. Id.  
205. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1687. 
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with a child’s well-being.206  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision 
in Damron may provide an illustration of the nexus standard.207 
4. North Dakota’s Standard, as Set Forth in Damron 
The most recent North Dakota child custody case alluding to the use of 
any one of the standards above is Damron.208  In Damron, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court did not adopt the per se approach.209  The court explicitly 
stated that “a custodial parent’s homosexual household is not grounds for 
modifying custody.”210  And, as previously stated, the per se approach 
allows the court to deny custody to a homosexual parent solely because the 
parent is homosexual.211 
Whether the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the middle ground 
or nexus approach to reach its conclusion in Damron is yet to be 
determined.212  The court cited decisions of other courts, alluding to use of 
the middle ground approach, when it stated that “[o]ther courts generally 
have recognized that, in the absence of evidence of actual or potential harm 
to the children, a parent’s homosexual relationship, by itself, is not 
determinative of custody.”213  The words “by itself” make it appear as 
though those courts, in compliance with the middle ground approach, allow 
homosexuality to be considered as one factor, among others, in determining 
child custody and custody modification.214  While the North Dakota 
Supreme Court alluded to the use of the middle ground standard by other 
courts, the Damron court stressed that evidence of an environment detri-
mental to the child’s best interests is imperative to child custody and 
custody modification claims.215  Furthermore, the court repeatedly asserted 
 
206. Id. 
207. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (discussing Damron’s use of the nexus approach, as 
opposed to the per se or middle ground approaches). 
208. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d 871, 876. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Huff, supra note 2, at 699. 
212. See Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (overruling the “presumption of harm to 
children” living under the care of a homosexual parent, and announcing the rules of other courts to 
determine a more appropriate rule to be applied in Damron). 
213. Id. 
214. Huff, supra note 2, at 700. 
215. See Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (offering the rules of other courts regarding the 
custody of homosexual parents, and stating that the party moving for a child custody change under 
the applicable North Dakota statutes must show that custody modification is “necessary to serve 
the best interests of the children”). 
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that the best interests of the child should be the main focus in such 
proceedings.216 
The court’s persistence in stating that the child’s best interests are the 
main and only focus makes the Damron decision one that attaches less 
stigmatization to homosexual parenting than the Jacobson and Schlotman 
analyses.217  Furthermore, the Damron decision and language of the nexus 
standard are similar to standards used to award custody to heterosexual 
parents in cases where no homosexual parent is involved.218  Although the 
court did not explicitly state which approach it used, the Damron decision 
appears to have been reached using the nexus standard.219  This conclusion 
may be drawn because the court discussed the homosexual relationship of 
the mother as merely one possible factor among many others in modifying 
custody.220  Furthermore, the court looked to the homosexuality of the 
mother only as a possible factor when the children’s father specifically 
argued that the mother’s homosexual relationship would be detrimental to 
the children’s well-being.221  However, the Damron court stated that homo-
sexuality may be considered as a factor only when the father provides 
“evidence of actual or potential harm to the children,” and the children’s 
father could not offer this evidence.222  The court’s decision in Damron, in 
applying the modern nexus standard, may provide a model to be considered 
in future custody matters in North Dakota.223 
IV. DAMRON AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE NORTH DAKOTA CASES 
As previously stated, most courts maintain that the primary focus in 
child custody cases is the best interests of the child.224  However, in many 
custody cases in which homosexual parents are involved, courts also 
 
216. Id. 
217. Compare Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality cannot be 
grounds for custody modification), with Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) 
(holding that a homosexual relationship may be considered as grounds for modification). 
218. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that the noncustodial parent did not 
offer proof sufficient to show that the relationship of the homosexual parent would endanger the 
children); see also Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350, 353 (N.D. 1983) (stating that a father’s 
cohabitation with a woman did not mandate custody modification absent a showing of detriment 
to the child’s best interests). 




223. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing Damron as a model for future child custody 
cases). 
224. See Damron, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873 (stating that the focus of the court should be the 
child’s best interests); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) (enumerating 
various factors affecting the best interests of the child). 
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discuss the relationships and sexual orientation of the child’s gay or lesbian 
parent.225  The fact that a parent is homosexual should not be an issue in 
child custody cases unless a parent’s relationship in general directly inter-
feres with the best interests of the child.226  Likewise, the homosexuality of 
a parent should not be a factor in the outcome of the custody dispute in 
making initial custody or custody modification determinations.227 
The discussion of parents’ private lives places great burdens on homo-
sexual parents striving to obtain or maintain custody of their children.228  
The consideration of homosexuality, rather than the ability of an individual 
to parent successfully, discounts a homosexual parent’s ability to raise his 
or her children.229  This consideration arguably perpetuates social misunder-
standings and fears of homosexuality, because it implies that the parenting 
skills of homosexual and heterosexual individuals are unequal.230  While the 
child’s best interests continue to form the basis of courts’ custody determi-
nations, so too does the issue of whether a homosexual parent may further 
those interests.231  A court’s conclusion, therefore, hinges on the acceptable 
balance between the best interests of the child, and the rights to privacy and 
to raise children, as shown in Lawrence and Meyer.232 
A. THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT 
It is true that the child’s best interests are important facets in child 
custody matters.233  Parents’ rights, however, must not be discounted.234  
The fear that a parent may lose his or her child may be one of the most 
wrenching experiences that a parent faces.235  In fact, some homosexual 
 
225. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993) (discussing, at great 
length, the father’s views and societal attitudes toward homosexuality, and how homosexuality 
may affect children in child custody matters); Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (opining that the mores 
of society dictate the need to keep children with the heterosexual parent). 
226. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1666.  
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Huff, supra note 2, at 696. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398-
400 (1923); Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d 871, 874; see also discussion 
infra Part III.A (analyzing the fundamental rights to privacy and to have and raise children, as 
supplied by Lawrence v. Texas and Meyer v. Nebraska, respectively). 
233. See Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W.2d 869, 871 (N.D. 1919) (explaining that the child’s 
best interests is the court’s utmost concern). 
234. See generally D.L. Hawley, 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d Custody and Visitation of 
Children By Gay and Lesbian Parents 403 § 19 (2007) (“Sexual orientation alone is not a 
sufficient basis to modify parental rights and responsibilities.”). 
235. Id. 
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parents facing child custody issues avoid disclosing the fact that they are 
homosexual in order to keep their children if they believe that courts will 
deny them custody.236  Several constitutional arguments favor the elimina-
tion of the additional requirements that gay and lesbian parents face in order 
to obtain and maintain custody of their children.237 
The argument that a person has a constitutional right to equal protec-
tion was discussed in the appellant’s brief in Damron.238  The appellant’s 
brief stated that “where a classification burdens a fundamental right or 
targets a suspect class, strict scrutiny is applied to ensure that the discrimi-
nation is necessary and narrowly[]tailored to advance a compelling govern-
mental purpose.”239  It has been debated, however, whether homosexuality 
is a fundamental right.240  The United States Supreme Court generally 
avoids the topic.241 
Whether a parent is homosexual or heterosexual does not remove that 
parent’s constitutional and fundamental right to bear and raise children.242  
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court opined that an 
individual has the right to “establish a home and bring up children.”243  
Through Meyer, it may be argued today that a right to bring up children 
allows a parent to raise his or her child whether the parent is homosexual or 
heterosexual, provided that the upbringing does not interfere with the best 
interests of the child.244  Therefore, even if a court would not recognize a 
person’s fundamental right with regard to sexual orientation, a court must 




237. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 565-67 (discussing the rights of homosexuals, but not 
reaching a conclusion as to whether sexuality is a fundamental right); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966) (finding that fundamental rights are protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause, even though not explicitly stated in the Constitution); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398-
400 (asserting that the right to bear and raise children is a fundamental interest); Rosenblum, 
supra note 26, at 1696 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399) (“[The] right to ‘bring up children’ is 
within the scope of [F]ourteenth [A]mendment protection.”). 
238. Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 4. 
239. Id. 
240. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual 
sexual acts was unconstitutional). 
241. See id. (deeming a Texas statute unconstitutional because it criminalized sodomy, but 
not stating whether a fundamental right exists). 
242. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398-400 (holding that individuals have a fundamental right to bear 
and raise children). 
243. Id. 
244. See id. (holding that it is a fundamental right to raise and bear children, but not 
discussing sexuality in reference to who may or may not raise children). 
245. Id.  
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It may further be argued that a classification burdening a suspect class 
requires either a heightened or strict scrutiny analysis, the most stringent 
forms of analyses.246  Suspect classes are so deemed because they are 
“saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness 
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”247  Homosexual individuals fit the label “suspect class” because 
they have long been the subject of discriminatory statutes, such as that seen 
in Lawrence.248 
Strict scrutiny analysis mandates a necessary and narrowly tailored dis-
criminatory purpose, which furthers a compelling governmental interest.249  
If a court modified a child custody ruling due to a parent’s sexual 
orientation, and therefore his or her suspect classification, the modifying 
ruling would trigger heightened scrutiny.250  Given the history of discrimi-
natory statutes aimed at homosexuals and the statutes’ likewise discrimi-
natory purposes, one might conclude that modifying a child custody order 
based on homosexuality is discriminatory.251  The heightened or strict 
scrutiny analyses’ burdens are difficult to overcome, therefore making the 
discriminatory purpose less likely to prevail.252  However, while these 
rights of parents deserve consideration following the use of heightened 
scrutiny analyses, the interests of the parent must be balanced with the best 
interests of the child.253 
B. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN CONNECTION WITH 
DAMRON 
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron appears to have begun to 
focus more on the best interests of the child tenet, as it applied the most 
progressive approach—the nexus standard—to show that homosexuality 
cannot be a reason to deny custody without proof of actual harm to the 
child.254  Homosexuality is still a focus in Damron, based on the possibility 
that a parent requesting modification could somehow show that the child is 
 
246. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978). 
247. Id. at 357 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
248. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581-85 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute was 
unconstitutional because it criminalized sodomy, and opining that it targeted homosexuals). 




253. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the best interests of the child as set forth in 
Damron). 
254. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d 871, 876. 
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in danger.255  However, children are best served today in North Dakota 
through the Damron standard.256 
The legal analysis used in Damron is much more attuned to the child’s 
best interests than the standards used in Jacobson and Schlotman, which 
focused more on the homosexuality of the parent rather than the best 
interests of the child.257  The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron 
explicitly and frequently discussed the best interests of the child.258  
Moreover, the court focused on the recognition of “a doctrinal aversion to 
changing the custody of a happy child who has been living with one 
parent.”259  The court also expressed a need to maintain “stability and 
continuity in the child’s life, without harm to the child.”260  The sentiments 
declared by the Damron court repeatedly expressed a focus on the best 
interests of the child.261 
Following the Damron decision, North Dakota courts will likely focus 
more on the best interests of the child tenet in future custody hearings, 
when confronted with whether to award or deny custody or custody modifi-
cation to a homosexual parent.262  Courts will look to the true interests of 
the child rather than focusing on the private and personal actions of the 
parents when no danger is presumable.263  The court’s decision in Damron 
sets an example for future custody rulings regarding the homosexuality of a 




256. Compare Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality was not 
grounds for modifying child custody because the father did not offer proof that the custodial 
parent’s living environment was unsuitable for their children) with Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 
N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (finding that a homosexual parent engaged in immoral practices was 
inconsistent with providing an environment suitable for a child, and failing to look at facts proving 
that the heterosexual parent may indeed provide a better environment). 
257. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (“[B]ecause of the mores of today’s society, because 
[the mother] is engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home in which she resides with the 
children . . . the best interests of the children will be better served by placing custody of the 
children with [the father].”). 
258. Damron, ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874. 
259. Id. ¶ 6. 
260. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
261. Id. ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874. 
262. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (establishing a new standard in requiring more evidence 
to prove that a homosexual parent’s living environment would endanger a child). 
263. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the private lives of 
individuals must not be interfered with by state statutes); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 
(holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying child custody and requiring more 
proof of harm to a child). 
264. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality 
could be grounds for modifying a previous custody order); but see Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 
876 (holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying a previous child custody ruling). 
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V. OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER CHANGE 
At one time, courts both nationwide and in North Dakota denied 
custody to homosexual parents at the outset of a child custody or custody 
modification proceeding.265  Now, actual proof of harm is required if the 
noncustodial parent seeking modification argues that a child is harmed by a 
parent’s homosexuality.266  Damron requires more concrete evidence of 
detriment to a child in determining the child’s best interests, since the 
overruling of Jacobson.267  The amount of evidence necessary to modify a 
custody ruling favoring a gay or lesbian parent is yet to be determined.268  
This question presented after Damron, regarding the amount and level 
of evidence required to modify a custody ruling in favor of a child’s homo-
sexual parent, predicts future changes in North Dakota child custody case 
law.269  The North Dakota Supreme Court did not set a standard for the type 
or amount of evidence required to modify such a ruling.270  It is similarly 
not entirely clear what that evidence will mean for homosexual parents in 
North Dakota in the future.271  Perhaps the topic of sexual orientation will 
disappear from custody determinations altogether.272  Furthermore, perhaps 
no focus will be placed on the harmful distinctions between heterosexual 
and homosexual parents, thereby preventing potentially discriminatory 
court opinions.273  These questions are discussed in Parts V.A and V.B.274 
 
265. See, e.g., Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (modifying custody based on a mother’s homo-
sexuality and fearing the children may be harmed). 
266. See, e.g., Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 875-76 (requiring evidence that proves that a 
child is harmed due to the environment in which the child resides). 
267. Id. 
268. See id. (holding that homosexuality cannot be the basis for custody modification with-
out clear evidence that a child is harmed, but not stating what kind or how much evidence is 
needed). 
269. See discussion infra Part V.A (reviewing Damron and discussing the type and amount 
of evidence that Damron requires of a parent seeking to modify a previous child custody ruling). 
270. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that more evidence is required of a non-
custodial heterosexual parent requesting child custody modification, but not elaborating on how 
much evidence is required). 
271. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the evidence that North Dakota courts will 
require of parents attempting child custody modification). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. See discussion infra Parts V.A-B (discussing a modified approach that would apply to 
child custody and custody modification proceedings to eradicate courts’ determining homosexual 
as a limiting factor in obtaining or maintaining custody). 
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A. COMPARISON OF HETEROSEXUAL AND HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS: 
EVIDENCE COURTS REQUIRE 
Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court asked that the heterosexual 
parent seeking the modification of a custody ruling provide evidence that a 
child’s well-being is in danger upon remaining with the child’s homosexual 
parent.275  The heterosexual, noncustodial parent must “establish a 
significant change in circumstances which adversely affects the child.”276  
Moreover, the noncustodial parent has “the burden to show [that] modifica-
tion [is] necessary to serve the best interests of the children and to show the 
children’s present environment may endanger their physical or emotional 
health or impair their emotional development.”277  The noncustodial parent 
must provide evidence adverse to the custodial parent, that the home 
environment will otherwise harm the child.278  Perhaps significant to the 
topic of child custody and custody modification, the court is silent as to 
homosexuality in these particular rules.279  The court seems to suggest that 
there would be no difference in the amount or type of evidence that a parent 
would need to provide—regardless of his or her sexual orientation.280  
However, while the court is silent on the topic of homosexuality in these 
particular statements, homosexuality was still discussed in Damron.281 
As Damron implies, a homosexual parent seeking the modification of a 
child custody order, where a preliminary custody ruling favored a hetero-
sexual parent, would not need to prove to the court that the heterosexuality 
of the custodial parent would harm the child.282  To the contrary, the court 
stated that a modification may take place if a heterosexual parent provides 
enough evidence to show that the sexual orientation of the homosexual 
parent will harm the child.283  The difference in what is asked of the non-
custodial parent as to the modification of a previous custody ruling suggests 
 
275. Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
276. Id. ¶ 7, 670 N.W.2d at 874. 
277. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875. 
278. See id. (stating that the noncustodial parent must provide “some evidence [that] the 
custodial parent’s custodial environment may endanger the children”). 
279. See id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (“[A] custodial parent’s homosexual household is not 
grounds for modifying custody within two years of a prior custody order in the absence of 
evidence that [the] environment endangers or potentially endangers the children’s physical or 
emotional health or impairs their emotional development.”). 
280. See id. ¶ 13 (explaining that although the heterosexual parent offered testimony chal-
lenging the morality of his wife’s homosexuality as a basis for parental unfitness, the testimony 
was insufficient to show that her homosexual relationship was either actually or potentially 
harming the children). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. ¶ 1, 670 N.W.2d at 873. 
283. Id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
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that a greater burden is placed on the heterosexual parent to provide 
additional evidence of actual or potential harm.284  However, this difference 
also implies that unwarranted emphasis is still being placed upon the sexual 
orientation of the custodial homosexual parent, while the privacy of the 
heterosexual parent, especially with regard to his or her relationships, is 
preserved.285 
A court would not ask a homosexual parent to prove that the hetero-
sexuality of the other parent was causing harm to the child, because the 
morals of heterosexuality have not been stigmatized in the same way as 
those of homosexuality.286  A court would also likely find an investigation 
of the heterosexual parent’s sexual orientation to be unnecessary.287  As 
United States Supreme Court precedent has stressed, investigation into such 
private actions would be an invasion of privacy.288  It is apparent, therefore, 
that heterosexual and homosexual parents are treated very differently in 
maintaining or modifying child custody.289 
As previously stated, a court would not likely urge a parent to inves-
tigate the harmful effects that heterosexuality would have on a child.290  
However, as to how great the noncustodial heterosexual parent’s burden 
would be to justify modification of a prior custodial ruling favoring a gay or 
lesbian parent is uncertain.291  The Damron court only states that “there 
must be some evidence [that] the custodial parent’s custodial environment 
may endanger the children.”292  “Some evidence” is clearly an ambiguous 
measurement of the amount required to modify custody.293 
 
284. See id. ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d at 874 (citing Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶¶ 16, 18, 561 
N.W.2d 612, at 616-17) (“[T]he burden on a noncustodial parent seeking a change of custody is 
‘daunting’ and ‘arduous.’”). 
285. See Huff, supra note 2, at 701 (noting that courts place much emphasis on the morality 
of homosexuality when determining that the best interests of a child will be best served with the 
heterosexual parent). 
286. Id. at 702. 
287. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“[T]he right to make certain 
decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”). 
288. Id. 
289. See generally Damron, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (finding that a heterosexual parent 
seeking to modify a custody order that favors the homosexual parent must provide more evidence 
when a parent is homosexual); see also Huff, supra note 2, at 695-96 (arguing that homosexual 
and heterosexual parents are treated differently in custody cases). 
290. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (stating that the heterosexual, noncustodial 
parent must provide “actual evidence,” but not elaborating on the meaning of “actual evidence”). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (citing In re Thompson, 2003 ND 61, ¶ 12, 659 N.W.2d 
864, at 868) (emphasis added). 
293. Id. 
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The court did offer reference as to what evidence had been offered by 
the noncustodial father in Damron, however.294  The father of the children 
had offered that the children’s mother’s homosexuality and homosexual 
relationship set the wrong moral character example for his children.295  The 
court stated that the father, in asserting this, did not provide evidence that 
the mother’s homosexuality or homosexual relationship was causing “actual 
or potential harm to the children.”296 
As applied, Damron requires more evidence in future child custody 
cases where non-custodial parents wish to modify a custody ruling based on 
the homosexuality of the custodial parent.297  The court’s silence, how-
ever—as to how much or what type of evidence must be presented to justify 
modification of a previous custodial hearing favoring the homosexual 
parent—could prove to be very beneficial for homosexual parents in North 
Dakota.298  Heterosexual parents seeking modification due to the homosex-
uality of the custodial parent are burdened to provide evidence to satisfy an 
ambiguous standard that will convince North Dakota courts that a child is 
actually or potentially being harmed.299  The Damron court’s requirement 
does not provide a clear definition of “actual or potential harm.”300 
The Damron court’s requirement of “potential harm” is significant in 
this regard.301  The children’s father in Damron argued that his ex-wife’s 
relationship had the potential to set “the wrong moral character for [his] 
children.”302  While “potential harm” may be viewed as a relatively easy 
standard to satisfy, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
and required more evidence.303  The court’s rejection of the father’s 
“potential harm” fails to aid the noncustodial parent attempting to modify 
 




298. See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text (explaining the ambiguities of 
Damron’s language as to the amount and level of evidence necessary to modify custody and to 
remove children from the custody of a homosexual parent).   
299. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (reviewing the language from Damron 
requiring the moving parent to provide “actual or potential harm”).  
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custody due to the homosexuality of the custodial parent.304  The court did 
not further define how “potential harm” might be satisfied.305 
As Damron shows, immorality as related to homosexuality and raising 
children is no longer accepted as an argument in North Dakota child 
custody hearings.306  As opposed to previous North Dakota child custody 
cases, custody modification based on homosexuality alone will not occur.307  
Much more evidence is required to show that the best interests of the child 
are jeopardized.308  While a child’s best interests might more easily be 
satisfied by North Dakota’s Damron standard, perhaps the existing standard 
might benefit from further adaptations.309 
B. PROPOSAL FOR THE ADOPTION OF MORE FAVORABLE LEGAL 
STANDARDS IN NORTH DAKOTA 
As discussed, courts have traditionally applied either the per se, middle 
ground, or nexus standards to child custody cases involving homosexual 
parents.310  Damron appears to have applied the nexus approach, as 
homosexuality was not grounds to modify custody without evidence of 
actual or potential harm to the child.311  While the nexus approach is likely 
the most favorable standard applied to modern custodial rulings, it is also 
true that it continues to factor in homosexuality, albeit in a much less 
emphasized manner.312  Courts should not focus on homosexuality when 
determining the best interests of the child.313  Placing emphasis on homo-
sexuality allows a court to disservice a homosexual parent’s ability to raise 
a child.314  Emphasizing homosexuality also discounts a child’s true best 
 
304. See id. (showing that the father testified that the children’s mother’s homosexual 
relationship was detrimental to the children’s wellbeing, but stating that this testimony was not 
enough to satisfy even the requirement of showing potential harm). 
305. See id. (providing that “potential harm” may be offered, but rejecting the father’s 
argument, and leaving the question open as to when “potential harm” may be satisfied). 
306. Id. 
307. See id. ¶ 9, 670 N.W. at 875 (overruling Jacobson, which created a presumption that a 
showing of homosexuality was alone enough to justify a custody modification).   
308. Id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.   
309. See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing possible future adaptations of the Damron 
standard). 
310. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-3 (discussing the nexus, middle ground, and per se 
approaches); Huff, supra note 2, at 699 (stating that courts apply either the per se, middle ground, 
or nexus tests to child custody determinations involving homosexual parents). 
311. Damron, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875. 
312. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 695-96 (arguing that courts place too much 
emphasis on homosexuality, but that the child’s best interests may be well served by living with 
the homosexual parent). 
313. Id. at 699. 
314. Id. 
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interests, because a homosexual parent may indeed provide a better 
environment than a heterosexual parent.315 
The best legal standard to apply to child custody matters is one that is 
silent on the topic of sexual orientation, to ensure both the best interests of 
the child and rights of the parents.316  The rights of gay or lesbian parents 
would be recognized because their sexual orientation would not be 
addressed, thus preserving their right to privacy.317  Courts should recog-
nize that “[w]hether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, 
and whether and how to establish a family—these are among the most basic 
of every individual’s liberty.”318  Parents’ privacy and right to raise 
children, therefore, should not be intruded upon unless the child’s best 
interests are harmed.319  In addition to preserving parents’ privacy, there 
would be no difference as to the evidence that a homosexual or heterosexual 
parent might provide to modify a custody ruling.320 
The best interests of the child factors, upon which judiciaries so often 
purport to center their custody rulings, would also be benefited if courts 
adopted a standard ignoring the sexual orientation of the parents.321  Like 
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron, future child custody and 
custody modification determinations would be based solely on “maintaining 
stability and continuity in the child’s life.”322  Future custody determina-
tions using this modified standard would also spare “children the ‘painful, 
disruptive, and destabilizing’ effects of repeat custody litigation” that arise 
in modification proceedings.323 
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s finding in Damron suggests that a 
heterosexual noncustodial parent may still show that homosexuality has the 
potential to, or actually will, adversely affect a child.324  However, the 
 
315. Id. 
316. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (regarding privacy as a 
fundamental interest, thereby inferring that private homosexual conduct may not be treated 
differently than heterosexual conduct); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health Mass., 798 N.E.2d 941, 
956 (Mass. 2003) (opining that same-sex couples have the right to marry, thereby allowing them 
the same benefits to child custody that heterosexual couples have). 
317. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559 (finding that privacy is a fundamental interest). 
318. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959. 
319. Id.; Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d 871, 873. 
320. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the amount of evidence that a parent seeking 
custody modification must offer); see generally Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (failing to 
elaborate on whether a homosexual parent pursuing modification must show that heterosexuality 
will endanger the child’s well-being). 
321. Damron, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d at 874. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. (citing Quarne v. Quarne, 1999 ND 188, ¶ 9, 601 N.W.2d 256). 
324. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W. 2d at 876 (requiring the  moving party to present evidence of 
actual or potential harm to the children). 
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Damron ruling is based largely upon requiring that, regardless of the 
custodial parent’s sexual orientation, the noncustodial parent show “some 
evidence” of danger to the child’s well-being.325  Future courts should focus 
on the Damron standard in this regard, while eliminating any discussion of 
how homosexuality itself will endanger the children involved.326 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The notion that homosexual parenting may be harmful to children has 
long been debated and may continue to be debated for years to come.327  
Recent child custody decisions have perpetuated arguments surrounding 
morality and professed differences between the parenting of homosexual 
and heterosexual individuals.328  However, scholars and courts have also 
noted that there is no difference between the parenting skills of homosexual 
and heterosexual parents.329  The emphasis on homosexuality in child 
custody determinations, therefore, has changed greatly in recent decades.330  
Courts are moving away from an emphasis on homosexuality and more to 
parents’ rights to bear and raise children, to protection of privacy, and to 
true observance of the best interests of children.331 
North Dakota courts have followed this pattern, largely focusing on the 
best interests principle and ignoring arguments that homosexuality will 
 
325. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875. 
326. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality cannot be grounds to 
modify custody); Huff, supra note 2, at 695 (stating that courts should not look to the 
homosexuality of a parent in determining child custody matters, because homosexual parents 
provide an adequate upbringing regardless of their sexuality).  Both parents’ and children’s rights 
will likely be best served in this capacity because the court does not place focus on the sexuality 
of the parent, which only speculatively would have an effect on the child.  See generally Huff, 
supra note 2, at 695 (proposing that a fairer outcome would be reached if courts would cease their 
focus on the homosexuality of parents in child custody matters). 
327. See Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (“[A] homosexual parent is as able as a heterosexual 
parent to raise a well-adjusted child” and that “courts should not find a distinction between 
homosexual and heterosexual parenting”). 
328. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (stating that social ideals of 
homosexuality cannot be ignored when making a custody decision). 
329. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a reason to 
modify custody where the children appear happy and healthy in their current environment); Huff, 
supra note 2, passim. 
330. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (stating that homosexuality may be a significant factor 
in denying custody); but see Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality 
cannot be grounds for modifying child custody). 
331. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (discussing the right to privacy); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding that the right to bear and raise children 
is a fundamental right); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (requiring more evidence for custody 
modification to ensure the best interests of the child). 
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endanger a child’s well-being or moral upbringing.332  The changing focus 
of custody rulings and custody modifications will likely continue to affect 
jurisdictions that have not adopted the contemporary nexus rule.333  These 
changes may thereby prompt the adoption of a further-modified nexus 
standard as homosexual parents continue to press courts to eliminate the 
emphasis of sexual orientation.334 
A change may be seen in future North Dakota cases, as well.335  The 
Damron ruling has opened doors for future custody rulings.336  Although 
homosexuality was considered as a factor in modifying custody in Damron, 
provided enough evidence was shown to justify the modification, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court’s decision did not place a clear minimum on the 
amount of evidence that must be provided by the noncustodial parent.337  
This ambiguity places a heavy burden on a heterosexual noncustodial 
parent, and implies that a noncustodial parent will unlikely succeed in his or 
her endeavors to remove children from the custody of a homosexual parent, 
based on sexual orientation.338 
United States Supreme Court precedent shows that ending discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation has been an arduous endeavor.339  When 
Supreme Court Justices agree with society’s notions and fears of homosex-
uality, and likewise enunciate these mores and values in Court decisions, 
the task of alleviating the stigmatization of homosexual individuals 
becomes even more daunting.340  Courts have steadily departed from 
approving of discriminatory statutes and practices, however.341  This 
conclusion is evidenced by North Dakota Supreme Court custody rulings 
within the past twenty-five years.342  Courts that once focused on 
 
332. See, e.g., Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a per se 
bar to custody, and stating that the best interests of the child should be the focus of the court in 
child custody matters). 
333. Gill, supra note 6, at 362. 
334. Id. 




339. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (denying 
readmission of a former Boy Scouts member to the organization via the New Jersey public 
accommodation statute, because the private organization, although alleging it followed a set of 
mores and standards disallowing homosexual members, did not fall under the statute). 
340. Id. 
341. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (opining that the state 
cannot interfere with the private acts of individuals); Dale, 530 U.S. at 678-79 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Court should not allow an organization to discriminate against a 
homosexual male); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (not setting a clear standard for the amount 
of evidence heterosexual noncustodial parents must bring to modify custody). 
342. Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876. 
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homosexuality to justify removing children from their parents now make 
modification based solely on homosexuality nearly impossible.343  Changes 
are necessary to further ensure that homosexuality is not considered in 
custody rulings, thus compelling courts to determine only the best interests 
of the child.344  Courts in North Dakota and nationwide are almost certainly 
moving in this direction, and will adopt standards that mirror these 




344. Gill, supra note 6, at 362. 
345. See generally Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (using a standard much closer to the nexus 
standard, which focuses less on homosexuality as a factor determining custody); see also Huff, 
supra note 2, at 695 (arguing that homosexuality should not be a factor considered in determining 
custody, because courts should not recognize a difference in the parenting abilities of homosexual 
and heterosexual parents). 
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